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DIGITAL FINANCIAL INCLUSION: 
OBSERVATIONS AND INSIGHTS FROM 




Digital banks, also known as “virtual banks” in Hong Kong, have a role to 
play in the jurisdiction’s financial inclusion agenda. According to a Google survey 
published in 2020, an estimated 1.8 million Hong Kong adults are expected to 
have a virtual bank account by 2025.1 Likewise, in a 2019 
PricewaterhouseCoopers digital banking customer survey of 4,500 customers 
across Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia, more than half of respondents in 
Hong Kong showed interest in becoming a virtual bank customer.2 However, 
thirty-eight percent of respondents in Hong Kong also said that they did not trust 
virtual banks with their personal data, while thirty-three percent did not believe 
virtual banks to be financially stable.3 The same report also showed that although 
trust in traditional banks is high, customers who experienced frustrations with 
traditional banks were twice as likely to sign up with virtual banks.4 It is estimated 
by Bloomberg that virtual banks will snare as much as thirty percent of the 
revenue of traditional banks in Hong Kong,5 and Moody’s has predicted that 
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 1.  Susannah Binsted, The Rise of Virtual Banks, FINDER (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.finder.com/ 
hk/virtual-banking-statistics [https://perma.cc/8LM9-2U7Y]. 
 2.  Harjeet Baura, Virtual Banking: Customers Take Charge – Are You Ready?, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 3 (Nov. 2019), https://www.pwchk.com/en/industries/financial-services/ 
banking-and-capital-markets/publications/2019-digital-banking-customer-survey.html [https://perma.cc/ 
KT5V-UG6E]. 
 3.  Id. at 5–6. 
 4.  Id. at 12. 
 5.  Hong Kong Starts Granting Licenses for Virtual Banks, STRAITS TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019), https:// 
www.straitstimes.com/business/banking/hong-kong-starts-granting-licenses-for-virtual-banks [https:// 
perma.cc/HVJ3-TC2V]. 
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virtual banks may create significant competition for most traditional banks in 
Hong Kong, except for the four largest Hong Kong banks.6 
This Article examines issues affecting virtual banks, specifically those issues 
related to the financial technology (fintech) disruption and dealing with 
alternative banking and finance. It covers an expansive interpretation of Hong 
Kong regulatory law regarding the requirements for the authorization of virtual 
banks, with an accompanying study and critique of the financial industry’s 
collection and storage of digital data in relation to privacy, drawing inspiration 
from international norms. It then discusses those regulations in terms of their 
effect on digital financial inclusion. Finally, it evaluates some potential challenges 
facing fintech lenders, virtual banks included, in a regulatory environment that 
promotes digital financial inclusion while seeking to manage financial 
consumerism. This Article adds to the literatures of banking, finance, 
information technology management, and consumer protection law enforcement 
by analyzing the latest digital financial inclusion developments in Hong Kong, 
following the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s (HKMA) issuing of virtual bank 
licenses in 2019 in an effort to promote financial inclusion and fintech innovation. 
This Article focuses on the connection between financial inclusion and digital 
financial inclusion as it assesses the role of virtual banks in Hong Kong’s financial 
inclusion agenda because this connection may be key to virtual banks’ success. 
Given that virtual banks are incorporated in and will operate from Hong Kong, 
a small market that has long been dominated by traditional banks, including 
those six recently designated by the HKMA as domestic systemically important 
banks (D-SIBs),7 virtual banks may not be able to provide complete financial 
inclusion for two reasons. First, under Hong Kong’s current legal regime, virtual 
banks are, in general, subject to the same legal requirements as traditional banks, 
which prompts the question of whether and how this might hinder digital 
financial inclusion. This Article undertakes the original contribution of 
examining why Hong Kong’s inflexible capital requirement, unclear demands on 
digital banking innovation, and outdated laws against technical risks may render 
its financial inclusion policy less effective. Second, limitations inherent in the 
business models of virtual banks can also hinder digital financial inclusion. The 
gaps and shortfalls in meeting financial inclusion needs will be expounded more 
 
 6.  Research Announcement: Moody’s – Entry of Virtual Banks is Credit Negative for Incumbent 
Hong Kong Banks, MOODY’S INVS. SERV. (May 14, 2019), https://www.moodys.com/research/Mo 
odys-Entry-of-virtual-banks-is-credit-negative-for-incumbent—PBC_1175869 [https://perma.cc/L75K-
WZCJ] (noting that these banks “have strong franchises that attract sticky deposits and therefore are less 
vulnerable to deposit competition from virtual banks”). 
 7.  According to the HKMA, authorized institutions designated as D-SIBs as of January 1, 2021 are 
(1) The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited; (2) Bank of China (Hong Kong) 
Limited; (3) Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited; (4) The Bank of East China, Limited; (5) 
Hang Seng Bank Limited; and (6) Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Asia) Limited. See Press 
Release, H.K. Monetary Auth., Designation of Domestic Systemically Important Authorized Institutions 
(Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/press-releases/2020/12/20201230-3/ 
[https://perma.cc/JUQ8-EPHP] (linking to the latest list of D-SIBs in the Annex). 
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clearly in Part IV of this Article, as they may come from either regulation or 
virtual banks’ business models. 
Where this Article is concerned, “traditional banks” refers to brick-and-
mortar banks that may not be dependent on the internet,8 whereas “digital 
financial inclusion” is specifically associated with virtual banks operating on the 
online banking model. Taking a technology-enabled approach, virtual banks are 
positioned to expand financial inclusion through algorithmic know your client 
(KYC)9 and predictive analytics. This technology can make onboarding clients 
faster and easier, meeting customer needs while simultaneously achieving 
regulatory compliance. Although digital banking makes banking more accessible, 
some of its drawbacks, such as technological profiling, may actually impede 
financial inclusion. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Following this introduction, Part II provides 
a basic anatomy of virtual banks in Hong Kong and their qualification 
requirements. Part III expounds on the regulatory environment and legal 
framework for virtual banks, as financial regulators in Hong Kong are revealing 
their intent to expand financial inclusion in the complex regulatory landscape for 
fintech. In the digital financial ecosystem, fintech is transforming finance and 
challenging current regulations related to financial inclusion. It therefore merits 
some consideration of whether virtual banks should be subject to some specific 
ex ante regulation that is not merely technologically neutral and general. This 
Part presents the main research findings of this Article as the author critiques 
Hong Kong’s current legal regime for consideration by Hong Kong’s financial 
regulators, lawmakers, and policymakers. Part IV summarizes the gaps and 
shortfalls in terms of the extent to which virtual banks meet financial inclusion 
needs, which may be caused by either regulation or virtual banks’ business 
models. Part V offers some concluding remarks. 
II 
VIRTUAL BANKS IN HONG KONG AND THEIR QUALIFICATION 
REQUIREMENTS 
This Part describes the virtual banking landscape in Hong Kong and the 
qualification requirements that virtual banks must meet to achieve authorization 
from the HKMA, as well as the relationship between virtual banking and fintech. 
It then discusses regulation of data privacy in the fintech world, before laying out 
how fintech can both help and hinder financial inclusion. 
 
 8.  The terms “traditional banks,” “brick-and-mortar banks,” “incumbent banks,” and “legacy 
banks” are used interchangeably in this Article. 
 9.  The KYC due diligence procedures fit within the HKMA’s anti-money laundering policy and 
guidelines whereby banks are required to verify the identity of their clients and evaluate the risks 
involved with maintaining a business relationship with them. Banks conduct KYC procedures when bank 
customers open accounts and as they periodically update their clients’ KYC details. Furthermore, banks 
are required to continuously monitor transactions made through the bank accounts in order to reduce 
the risk of identity theft, money laundering, and the financing of terrorism or criminal organizations, to 
give a few examples. 
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As per the Guideline on Authorization of Virtual Banks,10 a virtual bank is 
defined as “a bank which primarily delivers retail banking services through the 
internet or other forms of electronic channels instead of physical branches.”11 In 
a revised Guideline on Authorization of Virtual Banks published in 2018, the 
HKMA sets out principles for the authorization of virtual banks. This Guideline 
places particular focus on the required qualifications of virtual banks, including 
(i) the ownership structure; (ii) mandatory ongoing supervisory requirements; 
(iii) a physical presence in Hong Kong;12 (iv) maintenance of technology-related 
risks and information security; (v) other risk management; (vi) the presence of a 
credible and viable business plan; (vii) an exit plan for the winding-up of business 
operations, should it become necessary; (viii) customer protection; (ix) 
outsourcing of computer or business operations of virtual banks to third-party 
service providers; and (x) capital requirements.13 
A. The Current Landscape of Virtual Banking in Hong Kong 
In an effort to shake up retail banking through fintech, the HKMA granted 
eight virtual bank licenses over a span of a mere three months between March 
and May of 2019. On March 27, 2019, the HKMA granted banking licenses under 
the Banking Ordinance to Livi VB Limited, SC Digital Solutions Limited, and 
ZhongAn Virtual Finance Limited.14 Later, in the same manner, the HKMA 
granted another banking license to WeLab Digital Limited on April 10, 2019.15 
On May 9, 2019, the HKMA also licensed Ant SME Services (Hong Kong) 
Limited, Infinium Limited, Insight Fintech HK Limited, and Ping An 
OneConnect Company Limited to operate as virtual banks.16 Of these eight new 
virtual banks, three—Infinium, Livi, and SC Digital Solutions—are 
 
 10.  The Guideline on Authorization of Virtual Banks was first issued by the HKMA on May 5, 2000 
and subsequently updated on Sep. 21, 2012 under section 16(10) of the Banking Ordinance in Hong Kong. 
The Guideline was further revised on May 30, 2018. See H.K. MONETARY AUTH., BANKING 
ORDINANCE, AUTHORIZATION OF VIRTUAL BANKS: A GUIDELINE ISSUED BY THE MONETARY 
AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 16(10), at 1 (2018), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-
information/press-release/2018/20180530e3a2.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ2A-KYC6] (explaining that the 
2018 update supersedes the previous revised guideline). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 2–3 (explaining that “[it] is necessary to provide an office in Hong Kong for interfacing 
with” both the HKMA and customers). Distinct from a brick-and-mortar operating model, a virtual bank 
is nevertheless required to maintain a physical presence in Hong Kong as its principal place of business. 
This is an apt procedure for businesses that cover a large segment of retail customers. 
 13.  Id. at 5. 
 14.  Press Release, H.K. Monetary Auth., Granting of Virtual Banking Licenses (Mar. 27, 2019), 
https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/press-releases/2019/03/20190327-3/ [https://perma.cc/ 
79NX-7X94]. 
 15.  Press Release, H.K. Monetary Auth., Granting of Virtual Banking License (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/press-releases/2019/04/20190410-4/ [https://perma.cc/ 
YK92-D2QT]. 
 16.  Press Release, H.K. Monetary Auth., Granting of Virtual Banking Licenses (May 9, 2019), 
https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/press-releases/2019/05/20190509-3/ [https://perma.cc/ 
97YS-VLQ4]. 
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collaborations between financial institutions and technology firms,17 while Ping 
An OneConnect is an affiliate company of Pin An Group, an insurance giant in 
China. The main shareholders of the others (Ant SME Services, Insight Fintech, 
and WeLab Digital) are technology firms.18 
Activities from some of the virtual banks in Hong Kong indicate that 
traditional banks, also, can partner with fintech firms to form virtual banks, which 
in turn could operate as separate legal entities or as part of traditional banks’ 
existing business infrastructure.19 While virtual banks operate solely online, 
traditional banks can also provide more banking options—for example, speedy 
payment and transfers or easy account maintenance—to improve market choice, 
thereby promoting financial inclusion without necessarily being digital. 
In theory, virtual banks, whether in the form of technology companies or 
subsidiaries of financial institutions—such as incumbent banks or insurance 
companies—can increase financial inclusion because exclusively online operation 
is a more cost-effective alternative to the physical building and infrastructure of 
traditional banks. As digital set-ups are cheaper, a greater number of entities such 
as virtual banks—along with fintech start-ups and online-based payment 
companies—join the supply side, improving market choice and increasing 
financial inclusion. Virtual banks in Hong Kong are expected to conduct the same 
customer due diligence (CDD) and record-keeping procedures as traditional 
banks.20 Even so, use of big data makes it possible for virtual banks to approve 
 
 17.  Sukrit Khatri, A Skeptical Look at HK’s 8 New Virtual Banks, MEDIUM (May 22, 2019), https:// 
medium.com/swlh/a-skeptical-look-at-hks-8-new-virtual-banks-71bcd999a45d [https://perma.cc/DC88-
P56H] (explaining that owners of these three firms are, as indicated by the following parentheticals, (1) 
Infinium Limited (Tencent, ICBC Asia, Hillhouse Capital, and Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing 
Limited (HKEX)); (2) Livi (Bank of China (Hong Kong), JD Digits, and Jardines); and (3) SC Digital 
Solutions (Standard Chartered Bank, HKT, PCCW, and Ctrip)). 
 18.  See id. (explaining that these firms will not be a collaboration between financial firms and 
technology firms). Ant Financial, an affiliate company of the Chinese Alibaba Group, is a major 
shareholder of Ant SME Services. Insight FinTech’s shareholders are AMTD and Xiaomi. WeLab 
Digital is owned by WeLab, a fintech start-up in Hong Kong. 
 19.  For example, MOX Bank Limited (“MOX”), formerly known as SC Digital Solutions Limited, 
is a newly licensed virtual bank in Hong Kong launched by Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) 
Limited, in partnership with PCCW, HKT and Ctrip Finance. As per MOX’s website, “Mox is a licensed 
bank in Hong Kong under the name of Mox Bank Limited, a subsidiary of Standard Chartered Bank 
(Hong Kong) Limited.” See MOX BANK LIMITED, About Us, https://mox.com/about-us/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Z2U6-FF9P]. Within MOX’s corporate structure, however, nine of its twelve directorial 
members have previously held senior positions at Standard Chartered. See id. “The Directors [of MOX] 
consider the immediate holding company and ultimate holding company of the Bank to be Standard 
Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited and Standard Chartered PLC respectively . . . .” See MOX BANK 
LTD., CONDENSED INTERIM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (UNAUDITED) 18 (June 30, 2020), https://vpr. 
hkma.gov.hk/statics/assets/doc/100326/fd_int/fd_int_0620_pt01_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UZV-L4HJ]. 
As a subsidiary, MOX operates independently from its parent holding companies. Nevertheless, 
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited’s website invites clients to “[s]tep inside our Hong Kong 
virtual bank” as “[w]e believe our existing clients will become the first champions of this exciting new 
offering.” See Deniz Güven, Step Inside Our Hong Kong Virtual Bank, STANDARD CHARTERED (May 
29, 2019), https://www.sc.com/en/navigate-the-future/hong-kong-virtual-bank/ [https://perma.cc/S8KL-
9G65]. 
 20.  Bills Committee on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing (Financial 
Institutions) (Amendment) Bill 2017 and Companies (Amendment) Bill 2017, Legislative Council Paper 
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loan applications within minutes, without any physical document proof. Since 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are the backbone of Hong Kong’s 
economy, virtual banks’ establishment could be driven by demands to expand 
digital financial inclusion for those previously financially excluded and 
underserved, many SMEs included. 
Virtual banks are expected to improve the financial inclusion situation in 
Hong Kong. When the HKMA invited applicants for virtual banks, it had a two-
pronged goal: (a) to promote the application of fintech and innovation in Hong 
Kong to offer a new kind of customer experience; and (b) to promote financial 
inclusion, given that virtual banks’ business target is retail customers, some of 
whom were previously denied access to the banking system. Increasing digital 
financial inclusion can lead to institutions taking on riskier customers. Yet even 
virtual bank account opening is closely linked to the Anti-Money Laundering and 
Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) requirements, which were 
cited as reasons for traditional banks’ practices of rejecting risky customers, a 
problem known as “de-risking.”21 It remains to be seen whether virtual banks can 
maneuver technology to increase financial inclusion despite being subject to the 
same AML/CFT requirements. 
Since the HKMA’s regulatory aim is to enhance financial inclusion, it 
maintains “the view that virtual banks should not impose any minimum balance 
requirements or low-balance fees on customers.”22 Yet it is unclear to what extent 
the HKMA expects the expansion of virtual banks to improve financial inclusion. 
Given that virtual banks are digital in nature, they are capable of either financial 
inclusion or exclusion. Digital financial inclusion occurs when virtual banks apply 
big data in meeting the KYC requirements. For example, some virtual banks do 
not require clients to provide physical identity cards or document proof, making 
bank account opening easier and faster. On the other hand, virtual banks are 
prone to relying on algorithms to make and rationalize decisions. Digital financial 
exclusion will likely result from such algorithmic profiling. 
B.  The Mechanics of Digital Banking 
Unlike electronic banking—that is, online banking—which traditional banks 
can employ to diversify and assist their provision of services and products, virtual 
 
No. CB(1)496/17-18, at 1 (2018), https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/english/bc/bc07/reports/bc 
0720180124cb1-496-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4HK-S3VQ]. See also Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance, (2019) Cap. 615 (H.K.) (setting out the relevant CDD and 
record keeping requirements in Schedule 2). 
 21.  See HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED SECRETARIES, BANK ACCOUNT OPENING 
SURVEY: CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES IN COMPANIES OPENING BANK ACCOUNTS IN HONG KONG 3 
(July 2018), https://www.hkics.org.hk/media/publication/attachment/PUBLICATION_A_2418_HKICS 
_Bank_Account_Opening_Survey_Report_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/22RP-FAKY]. 
 22.  See Press Release, H.K. Monetary Auth., Guideline on Authorization of Virtual Banks (May 
30, 2018), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/press-releases/2018/05/20180530-3/ [https:// 
perma.cc/48ZL-L4FS] (explaining “that a key objective of introducing virtual banks in Hong Kong is to 
help promote financial inclusion by leveraging on these banks’ IT platforms that would lower the 
incremental cost of taking in additional customers”). 
06_LEE_DIGITAL FINANCIAL INCLUSION (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2021  12:37 PM 
No. 1 2021] DIGITAL FINANCIAL INCLUSION 101 
banks are internet-only banks.23 Virtual banks are distinguishable from 
traditional banks because the latter simply use the internet as another channel to 
their customers, who use the internet in combination with other channels to 
access a host of banking services via bank branches for branch banking, 
telephones for telephone banking, and automated teller machines for ATM 
banking.24 Virtual banking can be differentiated from electronic banking due to 
its lack of any reliance on physical infrastructure.25 Simply put, while traditional 
banks maintain the branch system, virtual banks operate on the “no-branch 
model.” And unlike traditional banks, which provide the flexibility of a dual 
system—either online or offline—to accommodate customers, virtual banks do 
not offer the same flexibility, as they forgo the physical buildings and 
infrastructure of traditional banks in order to operate primarily through the 
internet.26 
The technology-enabled prowess of virtual banks keeps them abreast of the 
latest online business opportunities, likely through harnessing knowledge of their 
customers’ lifestyles and applying big data power to analyze customer 
movements and behavior patterns. This makes it easy for virtual banks to cross-
sell financial products such as travel insurance, credit cards, loans, and savings 
deposits. There are pros and cons to the data-powered predictive analytics used 
by fintech banks27 for cross-selling. The pros include market choice and 
personalized recommendations for customers of fintech banks. The cons could 
be exploitative selling or mis-selling and misuse of data. 
C.  Fintech Regulation and Data Privacy 
Encouraging fintech innovation is not only compatible with other legal and 
regulatory objectives—including financial inclusion, stability and integrity, and 
consumer protection—but is also mutually reinforced through them.28 The 
governance of fintech companies focuses on several key aspects of consumer 
protection which include, among others, fair treatment of customers, conflicts of 
interest management, standardized pre-contractual disclosure practices, 
transparency on fees and charges, customer complaint handling and redress 
mechanisms, and liability and settlement arrangement. Conflicts of interest, for 
 
 23.  Christian N. Watson, The Growth of Internet-only Banks: Brick and Mortar Branches are Feeling 
the “Byte”, 4 N. C. BANKING INST. 345, 346 (2000). 
 24.  See id. at 351–52 (explaining that Wells Fargo had no intention at the time to start Internet-only 
banking because it assumed customers preferred “to use the Internet in connection with its other four 
channels: traditional branches, supermarket offices, ATMs, and telephones”). 
 25.  See id. at 349 (“The Internet banks are able to stay in business because of their amazing cost 
savings infrastructure (or lack thereof).”). 
 26.  Id. at 346–47. 
 27.  Different in concept from virtual banks, fintech banks refer to those banks that deploy financial 
technology in their provision of services or products. Fintech banks can include both virtual banks and 
traditional banks. 
 28.  GLOBAL P’SHIP FOR FIN. INCLUSION, 2014 FINANCIAL INCLUSION ACTION PLAN 2 (Sep. 2, 
2014), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014_g20_financial_inclusion_action_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
66KQ-MHDM]. 
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example, can be managed by acquiring customers’ consent, although customers 
are often unaware that boilerplate consents result in the sharing of their 
information or potential exploitation. 
One crucial aspect of consent is online storage of data or customer 
information, an issue of great relevance to virtual banks. To enhance 
transparency, and as a good practice, banks can observe the internationally 
accepted privacy protection guidelines, revised and issued by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development in 2013, by stating clearly in the 
privacy agreement where the customer data are stored.29 Mutually beneficial 
partnerships between banks and fintech firms, with the help of consulting and 
analytics firms, allow fintech firms to scale their technology by accessing banks’ 
large capital and customer bases, while banks gain assistance in harnessing 
customer data in order to improve services and product offerings.30 By leveraging 
data’s potential scale and power, fintech firms provide a data platform that 
“standardize[s] and clean[s] partner banks’ data, source[s] additional data from 
third parties” such as social media firms including Facebook, Google, and 
WeChat, and tests data in a confined secure environment—that is, the fintech 
sandbox.31 There are legal implications with sourcing and testing data. As such, it 
is considered good practice by banks, including virtual banks, to obtain separate 
consent from their customers for the purposes of sourcing data from third parties, 
given that banks only own data with respect to customer identification, often 
collected during the KYC process.32 This data normally do not include additional 
information pertaining to consumers’ spending habits and preferences, which is 
otherwise owned by social media firms, but can be used by banks for cross-selling 
purposes. 
D.  Fintech’s Influence on Financial Inclusion 
Particular characteristics of virtual banks that enhance financial inclusion 
include easier and faster bank account opening, easier ways to provide identity 
for compliance with KYC requirements, and quicker, algorithmically-driven 
decision-making for loan approval. Additionally, the imminent application of 
electronic identification (e-ID) will soon digitalize Hong Kong’s population, 
increasing the likelihood that virtual banks’ services will be more inclusive. Hong 
 
 29.  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], The OECD Privacy 
Framework, 100, (July 11, 2013), https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6HRW-R8PM] (“Generally, the emphasis on consent based on overly complex privacy 
policies that provide few real options and few limitations on collection and use diminish the effectiveness 
of privacy protections that are intended to support the individual’s role in controlling his or her own 
personal data.”). 
 30.  INST. OF INT’L FIN. & CTR. FOR FIN. INCLUSION AT ACCION, ACCELERATING FINANCIAL 
INCLUSION WITH NEW DATA 21–22 (2018), https://www.iif.com/portals/0/Files/private/finewdata_cfi.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BY22-NDSF]. 
 31.  See id. at 22; see infra Part III. 
 32.  H.K. OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R FOR PERS. DATA, GUIDANCE ON THE COLLECTION 
AND USE OF PERSONAL DATA IN DIRECT MARKETING 3 (Nov. 2012) https://www.pcpd.org.hk/ 
english/publications/files/DM_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEA4-T69K]. 
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Kong residents will in due course be issued a new e-ID that will give them easier 
access to online services offered by the government and, by extension, financial 
institutions.33 Digital ID solution is a fundamental element of a KYC strategy for 
Hong Kong in the optimization of the CDD process and, ultimately, the increased 
penetration of financial inclusion in the territory. 
Technology is an enabler. With the right technology, the right product 
offering, and the clear advantages that come with being more responsive and 
cost-effective than traditional banks, the eight new Hong Kong virtual banks will 
undoubtedly find a ready niche in a market where technology savvy clients may 
prefer “easier account opening . . . new credit card deals . . . (and cash back), and 
. . . more favorable credit lines to acquire assets,”34 especially if one presupposes 
that virtual banks would appeal to retail customers by being more sensitive to, 
say, the financing needs of SMEs and individuals. 
The possibility of virtual banks further restricting financial access, however, 
is quite alarming. While it is one thing for virtual banks to adopt intelligent 
fintech apparatuses to make risk assessment decisions, it is another matter for a 
smart machine to deny SMEs and individuals access to credit.35 Reliance on 
automated decision-making can lead to digital profiling, which may undermine 
the “rationality of algorithmic decisions.”36 Not only should these decisions be 
subject to review, particularly if they produce legal or similarly significant impacts 
on data subjects (for example, bank customers), but they also lack the margin of 
tolerance and discretion that might be expected by human regulatees who are 
cooperating with human enforcement agents. In this respect, European 
regulators have sufficient reason to doubt fintech’s effectiveness, and show an 
apparent readiness to bring human agents back into the loop.37 Article 22 of the 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) stipulates that 
data subjects have a right not to be subject to decisions based solely on automated 
processing (which may amount to profiling).38 This provision sets an archetypical 
standard of not granting licenses to fintech without some heavy qualifications to 
justify their deployments, for the simple reason that algorithmic decisions can be 
used to discriminate against data subjects.39 There is, however, no equivalent 
provision to article 22 of the GDPR under the Hong Kong regime. 
 
 33.  Nikki Sun, Hong Kong to Launch New ‘Electronic Identification’ as Part of ‘Smart City’ 
Blueprint, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/ 
economy/article/2115365/hong-kong-launch-new-electronic-identification-part-smart [https://perma.cc/ 
Q6XD-7ZL7]. 
 34.  See Khatri, supra note 17. 
 35.  See ROGER BROWNSWORD, LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: RE-IMAGINING THE 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 227 (John Paterson & Julian Webb eds., 2019) (“Now, while it is one 
thing for a smart machine to deny an agent access to credit, it is another matter for intelligent machines 
to make risk assessments . . . .”). 
 36.  Id. at 226. 
 37.  Id. at 228. 
 38.  Council Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. 
 39.  See BROWNSWORD, supra note 35, at 228 (“While [article 22 of the GDPR] is extremely vague 
and open to all manner of interpretations, it puts down a marker: Europeans are not willing to grant a 
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III 
THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT: POLICY AND REGULATION 
In general, the banking regulatory environment, both normative and non-
normative, aims to set and maintain coherent legal and regulatory standards for 
the purposes of risk prevention and mitigation. Consequently, regulatory 
standards are inevitably and closely tied to risks. For example, the HKMA’s risk-
based supervisory framework prescribes eight basic types of risks related to: 
credit, interest rate, market, liquidity, operations, and reputation, along with legal 
and strategic risks.40 But other than those risks that are common to all banks with 
or without a physical presence, virtual banks are particularly vulnerable to 
technical risks, which may result in an invasion of privacy and security breaches 
because virtual banks operate solely online. 
The current regime in Hong Kong does not subject virtual banks to specific 
ex ante regulation save for the Sandbox regime, which is, strictly speaking, a 
temporary mechanism instead of a specific regulation. The HKMA first launched 
the Fintech Supervisory Sandbox (FSS or Sandbox) in September 2016.41 In 
November 2017, the HKMA launched the FSS 2.0, which introduced the Fintech 
Supervisory Chatroom to facilitate regular and effective two-way communication 
between the regulator and the regulatee.42 The Sandbox regime is about 
developing a relationship between the regulator and a fintech start-up under 
which new technology can be tried out under close supervision but without the 
need to comply with some existing requirements, pending possible reformulation 
of the requirements when the technology is rolled out widely. 
Regulations for virtual banks include, among others, the Banking Ordinance 
and Banking Rules,43 the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
Financing Ordinance,44 and the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (PDPO).45 
Virtual banks are also governed by HKMA’s Supervisory Policy Manual46 and 
 
social license for automated decision-making without some heavy qualifications about bringing humans 
back into the loop.”); see also id. at 223–24 (explaining that algorithms can import bias and covertly or 
overtly discriminate). 
 40.  H.K. MONETARY AUTH., SUPERVISORY POLICY MANUAL, Risk Management Framework (IC-
1) (2017), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-functions/banking-stability/supervisory-policy-
manual/IC-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY3G-SHAN]. 
 41.  Press Release, H.K. Special Admin. Region, LCQ22: Support for Start-Up Enterprises (Feb. 7, 
2018), https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201802/07/P2018020700348.htm [https://perma.cc/J9LP-
YNUZ]. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See Banking Ordinance, (2019) Cap. 155 (H.K.); Banking (Capital) Rules, (2012) Cap. 155L 
(H.K.); Banking (Disclosure) Rules, (2012) Cap. 155M, (H.K.); Banking (Liquidity) Rules, (2015) Cap. 
155Q, (H.K.); Banking (Exposure Limits) Rules, (2019) Cap. 155S, (H.K.). 
 44.  Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance, (2019) Cap. 615 (H.K.). 
 45.  Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, (2018) Cap. 486 (H.K.). 
 46.  See H.K. MONETARY AUTH., SUPERVISORY POLICY MANUAL, Introduction (IN) at 1 (2001), 
https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-functions/banking-stability/supervisory-policy-manual/IN. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4GE-EG2W] (“This Manual sets out the HKMA’s supervisory policies and 
practices, the minimum standards AIs [that is, Authorized Institutions] are expected to attain in order to 
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the non-legislative HKMA guidelines such as the Treat Customers Fairly 
Charter.47 The following discussion will focus on the first three pieces of 
legislation as they relate to the minimum capital requirement, onboarding of 
clients, and data privacy protection. Notably, the regulatory framework has yet 
to catch on, considering that the PDPO is slated for legislative amendment. 
A.  Minimum Capital and Related Requirements 
As emphasized by the HKMA, in order to protect banks and their customers, 
all licensed banks, including virtual bank licensees, must meet the HKMA’s 
minimum paid-up capital requirement of HKD$300 million, as stipulated in the 
Banking Ordinance48 and the Banking (Capital) Rules.49 The HKMA thus 
refuted a previous suggestion, raised during the consultation process, of 
“allowing a lower initial minimum paid-up capital requirement, similar to the 
level for deposit-taking companies,” at HKD$25 million, stressing that the 
Banking Ordinance does not provide the HKMA with any flexibility whatsoever 
to authorize a virtual bank without it meeting all of the authorization criteria.50 
By comparison, “[t]he UK set[s] the capital requirement for its virtual bank 
licensees at US$5.8 million,” which is equivalent to approximately HKD$44.95 
million, “but requires them to develop exit plans,” with the regulatory intent to 
protect customers when virtual banks cease operations because of business model 
failures.51 
Since the HKMA also imposes a similar exit plan requirement, it was 
suggested that the HKMA should reduce the minimum capital requirement, 
although it did not accept this argument.52 This combination of a high capital 
requirement and an exit planning requirement could be quite onerous, since a 
high capital requirement is not only burdensome on its own but virtual banks 
must also comply with a resolution planning requirement. It might be reasonable 
 
satisfy the requirements of the Banking Ordinance and recommendations on best practices that AIs 
should aim to achieve.”). 
 47.  See Press Release, H.K. Monetary Auth., Treat Customers Fairly Charter (Mar. 28, 2014), 
https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-information/guidelines-and-circular/2014/20140328e1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z7CP-K7UV] (explaining the Charter and its guiding principles). 
 48.  Banking Ordinance, (2019) Cap. 155, § 97C(1) (H.K.). See also Press Release, H.K. Monetary 
Auth., Guideline on Authorization of Virtual Banks (May 30, 2018), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-
and-media/press-releases/2018/05/20180530-3/ [https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=14471]. 
 49.  Banking (Capital) Rules, (2012) Cap. 155L, § 226 (H.K.). 
 50.  H.K. MONETARY AUTH., GUIDELINE ON AUTHORIZATION OF VIRTUAL BANKS 
CONSULTATION CONCLUSIONS 7, 9 (2018), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-information/ 
press-release/2018/20180530e3a1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C48B-V9EF]. See Press Release, H.K. Monetary 
Auth., Guideline on Authorization of Virtual Banks (May 30, 2018) https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-
and-media/press-releases/2018/05/20180530-3/ [https://perma.cc/6HCC-VF9D] (explaining the public 
consultation role within the process of revising and publishing the Virtual Banking Guideline). 
 51.  Hejian Ma & Simon Wang, Letter to the Editor, For Virtual Banking to Thrive in Hong Kong, 
Regulators Must Encourage Small Players and Innovation, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 5, 2019), 
https://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3021167/virtual-banking-thrive-hong-kong-regulators-
must-encourage-small [https://perma.cc/S2F9-NV8B]. 
 52.  Id. 
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if prudential requirements could be calibrated according to the level of deposits 
held by virtual banks. In this case, a proportionate approach is arguably more 
suitable than a one-size-fits-all approach. 
Also relevant to banking capital is banking profit. It is possible that virtual 
banks will face greater challenges in maintaining both capital and profit levels 
due to the impact of COVID-19, which has compelled traditional banks to 
reassess their loan practices as bad loans loom large. Virtual banks will likely 
follow suit, which could disrupt Hong Kong’s financial inclusion agenda. It is 
uncertain in the following years whether the digital financial infrastructure, which 
underpins virtual banks’ operations, will and can be leveraged to overcome the 
financial challenges presented by the pandemic. 
B.  AML/CFT Requirements for Onboarding Clients 
Virtual banking typically entails the onboarding of individual customers 
remotely through electronic channels such as mobile apps or the internet.53 When 
compared with current operating models of onboarding clients in person—with 
particular reference to banks’ conducting of CDD measures when the customer 
is in front of staff—onboarding clients remotely may present greater risks to 
banks, as the HMKA warned in 2019.54 The HKMA further pointed out that 
certain factors aggravate these risks. These factors relate to, inter alia, the use of 
stolen or fake identities and the ability to create multiple fictitious remote 
account applications, which may pose challenges to deterring and detecting 
money laundering and other risks associated with financial crimes, apart from 
probable data security breaches.55 These potential risks have profound 
implications for financial services regulatory compliance given that virtual banks, 
similar to traditional banks, must comply with requirements under Hong Kong’s 
AML/CFT law56 and its AML/CFT Guideline for obtaining and verifying 
customer information.57 
 
 53.  Memorandum from Carmen Chu, Exec. Dir., H.K. Monetary Auth., to The Chief Exec., All 
Authorized Institutions (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/gb_chi/doc/key-information/ 
guidelines-and-circular/2019/20190201c1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4E6A-8JVH]. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance, (2019) Cap. 615 
(H.K.). The risks associated with remote onboarding clients may not be fully captured by Hong Kong’s 
AML/CFT law and its AML/CFT Guideline for customer due diligence purposes, as the regulations were 
formed when the onboarding of clients was conducted in person. 
 57.  See H.K. MONETARY AUTH., GUIDELINE ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COUNTER-
TERRORIST FINANCING (FOR AUTHORIZED INSTITUTIONS) 8 (2018), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/ 
media/eng/doc/key-information/guidelines-and-circular/guideline/g33.pdf [https://perma.cc/G858-G46C] 
(“[J]urisdictions, competent authorities, and AIs are expected to identify, assess and understand the 
ML/TF [Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing] risks to which they are exposed and take AML/CFT 
measures commensurate with those risks in order to manage and mitigate them effectively.”). 
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Traditional banks and virtual banks are subject to the same regulatory 
supervisory standards.58 Many established financial processes, including 
onboarding customers for loans and deposits, are still paper-based, as the 
regulations dictate that all customer records are to be stored for seven years in 
digital, microfilm, and paper forms.59 Since this storage requirement applies to all 
banks in Hong Kong, including virtual banks, it is clear that banking is an industry 
that prioritizes safety over speed or efficiency.60 
There are pros and cons to this regulatory inflexibility. The pros are that fair 
competition is ensured among traditional and virtual banks, while the cons would 
likely include hindering digital financial inclusion. Since regulatory requirements 
remain the same, it begs the question of whether virtual banks are practically able 
to take on board the riskier, rejected customers of mainstream banks. This is a 
point of central policy tension which requires some balancing act between 
financial inclusion and AML/CFT compliance tests. For virtual banks, it is also 
about risk perception, given that the onboarding of clients is guided by the risk-
based approach. It is debatable whether this risk-based approach—which 
encourages banks to open accounts for individuals or business entities with 
higher money laundering and terrorist financing risks but imposes higher 
responsibility for the continued monitoring of such accounts for a period of 
time—is consistent with banks’ expectations. 
C.  Data Privacy Requirements Under The PDPO 
The HKMA’s position has been that for the sake of fairness, regardless of 
whether or what new technology will be deployed, a legal or regulatory 
framework should be broad and technologically neutral in order to cover all types 
of banks. Likewise, both manual and electronic records are subject to data 
protection legislation in Hong Kong if they contain personal data.61 
While the European Union’s GDPR protects “the right not to be subject to a 
decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling,”62 and the 
right to object to the processing of personal data,63 there are no equivalent 
provisions protecting those rights in the PDPO. However, it should be noted that 
 
 58.  H.K. MONETARY AUTH., supra note 10, at 2 (“Virtual banks will be subject to the same set of 
supervisory requirements applicable to conventional banks. That said, some of these requirements will 
be adapted to suit the business models of virtual banks under a risk-based and technology-neutral 
approach.”). 
 59.  See Securities and Futures (Keeping of Records) Rules, (2017) Cap. 571O § 10 (H.K.) 
(“SF(KR)R”). According to section 5.2 of the HKMA’s Supervisory Policy Manual, the SF(KR)R 
applies to all Authorized Institutions, banks included. See H.K. MONETARY AUTH., SUPERVISORY 
POLICY MANUAL, Reporting Requirements Relating to Authorized Institutions’ External Auditors 
under the Banking Ordinance (IC-3) (2003), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-functions/ 
banking-stability/supervisory-policy-manual/IC-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J5S-YZ3K]. 
 60.  Khatri, supra note 17. 
 61.  The Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance is the data protection legislation in Hong Kong which 
contains the data protection principles. Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, (2018) Cap. 486 (H.K.). 
 62.  Council Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. 
 63.  Id. at art. 21. 
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under the PDPO, data subjects have the right to opt out of direct marketing 
activities which may otherwise be automatic in some cases.64 The PDPO also 
contains provisions that regulate data users from using personal data in data 
matching procedures.65 Data matching is the process of comparing two sets of 
personal data individually collected for different purposes via computer 
programs or by non-manual means,66 which is to some extent similar to 
automated processing or profiling. The main criticism of the PDPO in this area 
is that the regulation is not robust enough, such that it does not confer an explicit 
right for the data subject to object, and therefore does not sufficiently protect 
against the risk of invasion of privacy.67 
IV 
GAPS AND SHORTFALLS IN VIRTUAL BANKS MEETING FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
While virtual banking has the potential to be a step towards financial 
inclusion, it is not able to address every problem with financial access. This Part 
details the ways in which virtual banking may fall short of meeting the goals of 
financial inclusion, including problems caused by regulation and limitations that 
are inherent in the business model of virtual banks. 
A.  Impact of Regulatory Burdens 
The HKMA has maintained that regulations on banks must be 
technologically neutral. Hence, the same regulatory requirements are applied to 
virtual and traditional banks, regardless of whether or what technologies are 
used. This regulatory design is another example of the central policy tension 
between upholding fair competition—for all banks—and promoting financial 
inclusion—by fintech banks. It has been criticized for its failure to balance these 
two goals that are not necessarily contradictory. 
Arguably, the HKMA is mistaken in imposing the same regulatory 
requirements on virtual and traditional banks alike. The HKMA “does not 
expect virtual banks to offer services that are not possible for traditional banks 
to provide via their eBanking platforms.”68 Critics have questioned this principle, 
suggesting that there is no “point of issuing virtual bank licenses if the licensees 
 
 64.  Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, (2018) Cap. 486 §§ 35G, 35L (H.K.). 
 65.  Id. §§ 30, 31. 
 66.  See Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, (2018) Cap. 486 (H.K.) (“[A]ny procedure whereby 
personal data collected for [one] or more purposes in respect of [ten] or more data subjects is compared 
(except by manual means) with personal data collected for any other purpose in respect of those data 
subjects . . . .”). 
 67.  For one example of the criticism that the PDPO is insufficiently robust, see Robin Hui Huang, 
Cynthia Sze Wai Cheung & Christine Meng Lu Wang, The Risks of Mobile Payment and Regulatory 
Responses: A Hong Kong Perspective, 7 ASIAN J. L. & SOC’Y, no. 2, 2020, at 325, 339–340 (“Compared 
to the PDPO in Hong Kong, the GDPR also grants additional protection to the rights of its citizens. This 
includes the right to erasure (right to be forgotten), and the right to restriction of processing. Currently, 
there are no such rights in Hong Kong, and data controllers are only restricted by Principle 2 of the 
PDPO, which stipulates that any personal data shall not be retained for a period longer than necessary.”). 
 68.  Ma & Wang, supra note 51. 
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are not expected to offer new services”69 or to enjoy proportionately different 
regulatory treatment. Going forward, it is necessary for regulators, lawmakers, 
and policymakers to consider whether virtual banks should instead be subject to 
some specific ex ante regulation that is not merely technologically neutral and 
general, but rather acknowledges the differences between virtual and traditional 
banks. Otherwise, it may be too costly for virtual banks to operate. 
Subjecting virtual banks to the same regulatory requirements as traditional 
banks may prevent them from thriving.70 For example, those virtual banks 
supported by large corporations such as Ant Group, Tencent, Xiaomi, Ping An, 
Bank of China, and other heavyweight investors may not have difficulty meeting 
the minimum capital requirement, since they have “more financial capital at their 
disposal and less pressure to make profits in the short term.”71 However, the same 
requirements may exclude fintech start-ups from offering new services, given that 
the minimum capital requirement is a barrier to entry and thus also a barrier to 
the provision of new services by small fintech start-ups. The HMKA also does 
not set clear expectations or make suggestions for the creative financial services 
that virtual banks could potentially provide.72 
The HKMA has been criticized for both the stringent capital requirement and 
unclear demands on innovation, which may have discouraged fintech start-ups 
from applying for virtual banking licenses.73 For these reasons, the Hong Kong 
government was called upon “to review and reform its virtual banking policies to 
attract virtual bank investors from more diverse backgrounds.”74 In sum, the 
regulatory environment in Hong Kong is such that the policy has clearly been set 
to promote financial inclusion, while the regulatory framework may hinder 
financial inclusion. 
1.  Minimum Capital Requirement 
The HKMA’s inflexibility in exploring options for lowering the minimum 
capital requirement, in line with those applied to virtual bank licensees in 
comparable jurisdictions—for example, the United Kingdom—has caused public 
concern. A possible solution is to issue lower banking licenses to fintech start-
ups, allowing them to operate as deposit-taking companies rather than fully 
licensed banks, since they may struggle to meet the stringent capital requirement. 
In doing so, virtual banks with smaller capital can facilitate digital financial 
inclusion by extending basic banking services to retail customers, including 
individuals and SMEs that were previously financially excluded or marginalized. 
 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See id. (“[T]he HKMA should consider relaxing the capital requirements for virtual bank 
licensees and setting clear expectations for creative financial services in order for society to benefit from 
virtual banking.”). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
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This proposition also aligns with the spirit of the “tiered account services,” a 
new initiative by the HKMA that explores, with banks, the introduction of Simple 
Bank Accounts (SBAs).75 SBAs refer to a new “tier of [bank] accounts derived 
from traditional accounts [which] focus[] on [the] provision of basic banking 
services such as deposits, withdrawals, [and] local and cross-border 
remittances.”76 Narrowing the service scope and transaction volume required of 
SBAs means that less extensive CDD measures are required for those accounts.77 
Progressive or tiered CDD approaches have been developed as a result of the 
application of the risk-based approach to CDD measures.78 By implication, to 
facilitate financial inclusion, banks must be able to exercise reasonable flexibility 
with respect to the types of identifying information required.79 This is an example 
of how regulations towards both the minimum capital and AML/CFT 
requirements may be relaxed. 
2.  AML/CFT Compliance Requirement 
According to KPMG International’s Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey, 
issued in 2014, the cost of AML/CFT compliance “continue[s] to rise at an 
average rate of 53 percent [per annum] for banking institutions, exceeding 
previous predictions of over 40 percent [made] in 2011.”80 As of 2018, the average 
bank spends around US$48 million per year on AML/CFT compliance.81 
Rising AML/CFT compliance costs, uncertainty about the extent to which 
banks must exercise due diligence, and questions about the implementation of 
the KYC requirement have the potential to hinder financial inclusion. Indeed, 
virtual banks have been left reeling from the complexity of a legal and regulatory 
environment marked by a multitude of rules pertaining to data collection, 
storage, control, and ownership, inevitable by-products of the interplay between 
privacy (of personally identifiable information) and the KYC and AML/CFT 
requirements with which financial institutions must comply. 
 
 75.  Arthur Yuen, Tiered Account Services: A New Initiative on Promoting Financial Inclusion, H.K. 
MONETARY AUTH: INSIGHT (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-information/insight/ 
20190412.shtml [https://perma.cc/BCC9-YF77]. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF GUIDANCE: ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST 
FINANCING MEASURES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION WITH A SUPPLEMENT ON CUSTOMER DUE 
DILIGENCE 10 (Nov. 2017) http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/Updated-2017-FATF-
2013-Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ7Q-ZBC8]. 
 79.  See id. at 11 (explaining that flexibility is seen in the risk-based approach of the United States 
Customer Identification Programme of the Bank Secrecy Act). 
 80.  KPMG, GLOBAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY 7 (2014) https://assets.kpmg/content/ 
dam/kpmg/pdf/2014/02/Global-Anti-Money-Laundering-Survey-O-201402.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DKS-
YJ4F]. 
 81.  See Combating Financial Crime, KPMG (Mar. 2019), https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/ 
insights/2019/03/combating-financial-crime-fs.html [https://perma.cc/W99N-677A] (citing John Callahan, 
Know Your Customer (KYC) Will be a Great Thing When it Works, FORBES (July 10, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/07/10/know-your-customer-kyc-will-be-a-great-
thing-when-it-works/?sh=8b007278dbb9 [https://perma.cc/L48R-PMFL]). 
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3.  Data Privacy Protection Requirement 
As of publication, it is unclear whether changes to privacy requirements will 
be applied to the digital banking sphere and if so, what these changes will be. 
Neither is it clear when the HKMA and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
for Personal Data, Hong Kong will come up with a joint action plan to provide 
greater clarity on how and the extent to which virtual banks will be subject to 
existing personal data protection requirements. 
Public trust is key to virtual banks’ success. However, as mentioned in Part I, 
thirty-eight percent of the respondents of the PricewaterhouseCoopers survey 
indicated that they did not trust virtual banks with their personal data.82 In 
addition, the lack of privacy right protection in the PDPO against profiling and 
data matching—as referred to in Part III—will further erode public trust. Unless 
and until the legal gap can be filled, digital financial inclusion cannot be fully 
achieved. 
4.  Virtual Banks’ Ongoing Supervision Requirement 
With respect to virtual banks’ ongoing supervision requirement, the HKMA 
has said that it “does not consider it suitable to elaborate in the Guideline how 
specific supervisory requirements will be adapted to suit the business models of 
virtual banks.”83 The HKMA’s view reflects its recognition of the “unknown 
unknowns” in relation to (1) the virtual banking business model—due to virtual 
banks’ extensive use of cloud technology for data storage and transaction 
processing84—and (2) the new regulatory environment—brought on by fintech, 
whose exponential growth and speed of development is unprecedented in the 
building of financial infrastructures. 
The HKMA’s resolution to not set specific guidelines for the ongoing 
supervision of virtual banks parallels the ideas in Professor Roger Brownsword’s 
seminal book on law and technology, where Brownsword views regulatory 
mapping as somewhat difficult because it must contain both normative and non-
normative standards.85 Examples of normative standards are rules for onboarding 
clients and keeping records, which are part of the AML/CFT requirements.86 In 
contrast, the Code of Banking Practice, “a non-statutory Code” issued by the 
Hong Kong Association of Banks and “updated from time to time in response to 
market developments and new or changes to relevant laws and regulations,” 87 is 
normally treated as a non-normative standard. While regulators may be aware of 
the normative standards as they set the legislative parameters, they may not find 
 
 82.  Baura, supra note 2. 
 83.  H.K. MONETARY AUTH., supra note 50, at 3. 
 84.  See id. at 6–7 (explaining in response to comments about how “virtual banks would make 
extensive use of cloud technology and outsource data storage and transaction processing to third-party 
service providers” that the HKMA remains open-minded about alternatives for outsourcing). 
 85.  BROWNSWORD, supra note 35, at 192–98. 
 86.  See supra Part III.B. 
 87.  H.K. ASS’N OF BANKS, CODE OF BANKING PRACTICE (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.hkab.org.hk/ 
DisplayArticleAction.do?sid=5&ss=3 [https://perma.cc/D86V-76DU]. 
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it necessary or possible to include the non-normative standards, referring to the 
professionals’ codes of conduct as an example. The non-normative standards may 
not be known by the regulatees or may be considered to be outside the regulatory 
purview, unless they are spelled out by the banking associations. 
B.  Limitations in Virtual Banks’ Business Model 
Virtual banks may benefit from an open banking business model, in which 
banks work with third-party developers to further their own financial operations. 
In addition to the virtual banking licensing framework, the implementation of the 
Open API framework88 also allows for access to credit and new products “that 
cater to an array of niche markets underserved by the large banks,” thereby 
increasing financial inclusion.89 Open APIs, which combine digital services 
offered by multiple companies, including banks and non-bank fintech firms, have 
been “applied by over 50% of incumbent banks.”90 APIs play a significant role in 
financial inclusion as they have the potential to “enable secure, controlled, cost-
effective and granular access to data and/or functionality of systems.”91 An API 
ecosystem is conducive to financial inclusion.92 Indeed, one of the policy 
objectives for the Open API framework is to “allow banks and their partners 
(called third party service providers, or TSPs),” to access and use bank generated 
data to provide a broader scope of services.93 
Even so, the development of open banking—through the API framework—
is allegedly “stalling as the industry ‘is clouded by uncertainty on data and privacy 
governance.’”94 The slow transition to a truly functional API ecosystem is thus 
impeding greater access to credit, which in effect disrupts financial inclusion 
efforts mobilized by the HKMA and the banking industry. 
Both traditional and virtual banks can implement an open banking model, 
and may do so if they are interested in increasing digital revenue now that they 
are competing against each other. The increased partnership between banks and 
 
 88.  H.K. MONETARY AUTH., OPEN API FRAMEWORK FOR THE HONG KONG BANKING SECTOR 
1 (July 18, 2018), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-information/press-release/2018/20180718 
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TSPs, which allows banks to redirect customers to user interfaces (for example, 
websites and mobile apps), prompted the HKMA to issue the Open API 
Framework on July 18, 2018 for open API implementation. “An API is an 
interface that allows [banks] to synchronize, link and connect the database of 
service with any application”95 provided by TSPs, as the TSPs may interface with 
customers to provide services under the Open API Framework. Despite the 
potential benefits of opening up virtual banks’ data vaults to TSPs, “open 
banking has yet to gain full momentum in Hong Kong” as much of the 
infrastructure that would allow virtual banks to flourish is not yet in place.96 It 
can be difficult to identify further gaps or shortfalls in virtual banks’ business 
models because of the dearth of empirical evidence available for evaluation. The 
reasons for this are two-fold. First, virtual banks in Hong Kong do not publicly 
disclose details of their business models. Second, the launch of virtual banks has 
been seriously delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The issue of whether 
there are any gaps or shortfalls in digital financial inclusion caused by virtual 
banks’ business models will therefore have to be revisited in due course. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Financial inclusion is easier said than done, as it requires the concerted efforts 
of both the regulators and the regulatees—the banking industry—as well as the 
cooperation of customers.97 It is unclear to what extent the HKMA expects 
improvements to be made towards this regulatory aim through the establishment 
of virtual banks. There are also external factors creating further uncertainty that 
go beyond the reach of virtual banks: for example, loyal clients—especially those 
with the three note-issuing banks in Hong Kong, which together control most of 
Hong Kong’s banking—may still prefer to continue business with these 
incumbent banks, although they may not mind opening a new bank account with 
one or more of the eight virtual banks.98 Although easier account opening is quite 
achievable and, once achieved, would bring the industry one step closer to 
financial inclusion, there must be “enough product innovation to justify so many 
banks.”99 Eight new licenses may be five or six too many, as one former banking 
research analyst has warned.100 Regardless of its outcome, Hong Kong’s 
experiment with virtual banking will likely remain a noteworthy attempt to 
further digital financial inclusion. 
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